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Abstract—Artificial Intelligence (AI) has attracted a great deal
of attention in recent years. However, alongside all its advance-
ments, problems have also emerged, such as privacy violations,
security issues and model fairness. Differential privacy, as a
promising mathematical model, has several attractive properties
that can help solve these problems, making it quite a valuable
tool. For this reason, differential privacy has been broadly applied
in AI but to date, no study has documented which differential
privacy mechanisms can or have been leveraged to overcome
its issues or the properties that make this possible. In this
paper, we show that differential privacy can do more than just
privacy preservation. It can also be used to improve security,
stabilize learning, build fair models, and impose composition in
selected areas of AI. With a focus on regular machine learning,
distributed machine learning, deep learning, and multi-agent
systems, the purpose of this article is to deliver a new view on
many possibilities for improving AI performance with differential
privacy techniques.
Index Terms—Differential Privacy, Artificial Intelligence, Ma-
chine Learning, Deep Learning, Multi-Agent Systems
I. INTRODUCTION
ARTIFICIAL Intelligence (AI) is one of the most prevalenttopics of research today across almost every scientific
field. For example, multi-agent systems can be applied to
distributed control systems [1], while distributed machine
learning has been adopted by Google for mobile users [2].
However, as AI becomes more and more reliant on data,
several new problems have emerged, such as privacy viola-
tions, security issues, model instability, model fairness and
communication overheads. As just a few of the tactics used
to derail AI, adversarial samples can fool machine learning
models, leading to incorrect results. Multi-agent systems may
receive false information from malicious agents. As a result,
many researchers have been exploring new and existing secu-
rity and privacy tools to tackle these new emerging problems.
Differential privacy is one of these tools.
Differential privacy is a prevalent privacy preservation
model which guarantees whether an individual’s information is
included in a dataset has little impact on the aggregate output.
Fig. 1 illustrates a basic differential privacy framework using
the following example. Consider two datasets that are almost
identical but differ in only one record and that, access to
the datasets is provided via a query function f . If we can
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find a mechanism that can query both datasets and obtain
the same outputs, we can claim that differential privacy is
satisfied. In that scenario, an adversary cannot associate the
query outputs with either of the two neighbouring datasets,
so the one different record is safe. Hence, the differential
privacy guarantees that, even if an adversary knows all the
other records in a dataset except for one unknown individual,
they still cannot infer the information of that unknown record.
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Fig. 1. Differential privacy
Interest in differential privacy mechanisms not only ranges
from the privacy community to the AI community, it has also
attracted the attention of many private companies, such as
Apple1, Uber2 and Google [3].
The key idea of differential privacy is to introduce calibrated
randomization to the aggregate output. When Dwork et al. [4]
showed that applying differential privacy mechanisms to test
data in machine learning could prevent over-fitting of learning
algorithms, it launched a new direction beyond simple privacy
preservation to one that solves emerging problems in AI [5].
We use two examples to illustrate how those new properties
can be applied.
A. Examples
The first example pertains to machine learning. As shown
in Fig. 2, machine learning suffers from several problems,
including privacy violations, over-fitting and unfair models.
Recent research has shown that differential privacy mecha-
nisms have the potential to tackle those problems. First, to
maintain fairness in a model, the training data can be re-
sampled from the data universe using a differential privacy
mechanism [6]. Second, to preserve privacy, noise derived
from a differential privacy mechanism can be added to the
learning model [7]. Finally, calibrated noise can be applied to
1https://www.apple.com/au/privacy/approach-to-privacy/
2https://www.usenix.org/node/208168
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2generate fresh testing data to increase stability and avoid over-
fitting of the learning algorithm [4]. These successful applica-
tions of differential privacy show that learning problems can be
solved by taking advantage of several properties of differential
privacy, such as randomization, privacy preservation capability,
and algorithm stability.
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Fig. 2. Learning example
The second example comes from the realm of multi-agent
systems, one of the traditional disciplines in AI. A multi-agent
system is a computerized system composed of multiple inter-
acting intelligent agents, such as sweeping robots as shown in
Fig. 3. The faces are agents and the grid denotes the moving
environment of all agents. An agent can make decisions over
its direction of movement and can share that knowledge with
other agents to help them make their decisions. The goal
is for the robots to sweep all grids. Several problems exist
in this multi-agent system. First, as each agent observes a
different environment, it is difficult to share their knowledge.
The randomizing mechanism in differential privacy can help
to transfer the knowledge between agents. Second, commu-
nications between agents should be restricted to limit power
consumption. Here, the privacy budget in differential privacy
can help the system control to overall communications [8].
Third, when a malicious agent is present, like the agent in
the red face, they may provide false knowledge. Differential
privacy mechanisms can help improve the security level of
communications by diminishing the impact of that agent.
Malicious Agent
(Randomization)
(Composition)
(Security)
Communication Overhead
Knowledge transferring
Fig. 3. Multi-agent example
Both these examples show how current research is applying
differential privacy mechanisms to AI and how randomization
can bring several new properties to AI.
B. AI areas
In AI, there are no strict area disciplines. Researchers and
industries have built a birds-eye view of AI in all its diversity.
Take the perspective of the Turing Test, for example. When
programming a computer that needs to act like a human, the
computer must have the following capabilities [9]: natural
language processing so it can successfully communicate with
Fig. 4. AI areas in the view of acting humanly
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a human; knowledge representation to store what it knows
or hears; automated reasoning to use the stored information
to answer questions and to draw new conclusions; machine
learning to adapt to new circumstances and to detect and
extrapolate patterns; computer vision to perceive objects; and
robotics to manipulate objects.
Based on this birds-eye view, we roughly categorize three
major technical fields in AI: machine learning, deep learning
and multi-agent system. Knowledge learning and automated
reasoning can be processed by a multi-agent system; the
other functions can be accomplished through machine learning
and/or deep learning. In the view of the application, the
AI area includes robotics, computer vision, natural language
processing (NLP), etc.–see Fig 4.
Here, we note that although deep learning was originally a
series of machine learning algorithms implemented in a neural
network architecture, it has rapidly developed into a field of
study in its own right with a huge number of novel perspectives
and technologies, such as GANs [10], ResNets [11], etc.
Therefore, we place deep learning in its own category.
The purpose of this paper is to document how the differen-
tial privacy mechanism can solve those new emerging prob-
lems in the technical fields: machine learning, deep learning
and multi-agent systems. Applications such as robotics, NLP
and computer vision have taken advantage of technologies
such machine learning, deep learning and multi-agent system,
so we have no reviewed these applications in dedicated sec-
tions.
C. Differential privacy in AI areas
Calibrated randomization benefits some AI algorithms.
What follows is a summary of several properties derived from
randomization.
• Preserving privacy. This is the original purpose of dif-
ferential privacy. By hiding an individual in the aggregate
information, differential privacy can preserve the privacy
of participants in a dataset.
• Stability. Differential privacy mechanisms ensure that the
probability of any outcome from a learning algorithm
is unchanged by modifying any individual record in
3the training data. This property establishes connections
between a learning algorithm and its ability to be gener-
alized.
• Security. Security relates to malicious participants in
a system. Differential privacy mechanisms can reduce
the impact of malicious participants in AI tasks. This
property can guarantee security in AI systems.
• Fairness. In machine learning, a given algorithm is said
to be fair, or to have fairness, if its results are independent
of sensitive attributes, like race and gender. Differential
privacy can help to maintain fairness in a learning model
by re-sampling the training data from the universe.
• Composition. Differential privacy mechanisms can guar-
antee that any step that satisfies differential privacy can
construct a new algorithm that also satisfies differential
privacy. This property is referred to as composition and is
controlled by the privacy budget. In AI, composition can
be used to control the number of steps, communication
loads, etc.
Table I shows the properties that have been explored to date
for each of our three disciplines. In machine learning, differ-
ential privacy has been applied to private learning, stability
and fairness. In deep learning, privacy is the major concern,
but distributed deep learning and federated learning have also
been investigated. In multi-agent systems, differential privacy
has been used to guarantee privacy, provide security, and
ensure composition. Utility shows the ultimate performance
of the technology after adding differential privacy. Normally,
privacy-preserving comes with a utility cost. However, if the
differential privacy can contribute to stability, or security, the
utility may increase, such as in federated learning or fairness.
Note, however, that blank cells do not mean we can not
apply differential privacy mechanisms to those areas. As
differential privacy has been proved to work well in many
AI areas, in the future, more problems might be solved with
the advantages of differential privacy.
The purpose of this paper is to highlight several possible
avenues to integrate AI with differential privacy mechanisms,
showing that differential privacy mechanisms have several
attractive properties that make it quite valuable as a tool to
AI beyond merely preserving privacy. The contributions of
the paper are listed as follows:
• We have summarized several properties of differential
privacy mechanisms.
• We have shown that these properties can improve diverse
aspects of AI areas, including machine learning, deep
learning and multi-agent systems.
• We explored new possibilities for taking advantage of
differential privacy to bring new opportunities.
II. PRELIMINARY
A. Differential privacy
Consider a finite data universe X . Let the variable r
represent a record with d attributes sampled from the universe
X , a dataset D is an unordered set of n records from domain
X . Two datasets D and D′ are neighbouring datasets if they
differ in only one record. A query f is a function that maps
a dataset D to an abstract range R: f : D → R.
The target of differential privacy is to mask the differences
between the results to query f between the neighbouring
datasets to preserve privacy. The maximal difference is defined
as the sensitivity ∆f , which determines how much perturba-
tion is required for a private-preserving answer. To achieve this
goal, differential privacy provides a mechanismM, which is a
randomization algorithm that accesses the database and imple-
ments some functionalities. A formal definition of differential
privacy follows.
Definition 1 (, δ-Differential Privacy [12]). A randomized
algorithmM gives -differential privacy for any pair of neigh-
bouring datasets D and D′, and, for every set of outcomes Ω,
if M satisfies:
Pr[M(D) ∈ Ω] ≤ exp() · Pr[M(D′) ∈ Ω] + δ (1)
where Ω denotes the output range of the algorithm M.
In Definition 1, the parameter  is defined as the privacy
budget, which controls the privacy guarantee level of mecha-
nismM. A smaller  represents stronger privacy. If δ = 0, the
randomized mechanism M gives -differential privacy by its
strictest definition. (, δ)-differential privacy provides freedom
to violate strict -differential privacy for some low probability
events.
Sensitivity is a parameter used in both mechanisms to
determine how much randomization is required:
Definition 2 (Sensitivity). For a query f : D → R, the
sensitivity of f is defined as
∆f = max
D,D′
||f(D)− f(D′)||1 (2)
Two prevalent randomization mechanisms, Laplace and
exponential, are used to satisfy the definition of differential
privacy, but there are others, such as Gaussian mechanism.
Each is explained next.
B. Randomization: Laplace mechanism
The Laplace mechanism is applied to numeric outputs [13].
The mechanism adds independent noise to the original answer,
as shown in Definition 3.
Definition 3 (Laplace mechanism). For a function f : D → R
over a dataset D, the mechanism M in Eq. 3 provides -
differential privacy.
M(D) = f(D) + Lap(∆f

) (3)
C. Gaussian mechanism
Compared to a Laplace mechanism, a Gaussian mechanism
adds noise that is sampled from a zero-mean isotropic Gaus-
sian distribution. The noise Z is sampled ∼ N (0, σ2) to the
L2 sensitivity ∆f = maxD,D′ ||f(D)− f(D′)||2 as follows:
4TABLE I
PROPERTIES OF DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY IN ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
Selected AI areas Privacy Stability Fairness Security Composition Utility
Machine
learning
Private learning Yes Yes Decrease
Stability in learning Yes Increase
Fairness in learning Yes Increase
Deep
learning
Deep Learning Yes Decrease
Distributed deep learning Yes Yes Decrease
Federated learning Yes Yes Yes Decrease or Increase
Multi-
agent
system
Reinforcement learning Yes Yes Yes Increase
Auction Yes Yes Decrease
Game theory Yes Decrease
Definition 4 (Gaussian mechanism). For a function f : D →
R over a dataset D, the mechanism M in Eq. 4 provides
, δ-differential privacy.
M(D) = f(D)+ ∼ N (0, σ2), (4)
σ = ∆f
√
2 log(1.25/δ)/epsilon.
D. Exponential mechanism
Exponential mechanisms are used to randomize the results
for non-numeric queries. They are paired with a score function
q(D,φ) that evaluates the quality of an output φ. Defining a
score function is application-dependent, so different applica-
tions lead to various score functions [14].
Definition 5 (Exponential mechanism). Let q(D,φ) be a score
function of dataset D that measures the quality of output
φ ∈ Φ, ∆q represents the sensitivity of φ. The exponential
mechanism M satisfies -differential privacy if
M(D) =
(
return φ ∝ exp(q(D,φ)
2∆q
)
)
. (5)
E. Composition
Two privacy budget composition theorems are widely used
in the design of differential privacy mechanisms: sequential
composition [14] and parallel composition [15].
Theorem 1. Parallel Composition: Suppose we have a set of
privacy stepsM = {M1, ...Mm}, if eachMi provides an i
privacy guarantee on a disjointed subset of the entire dataset,
the parallel of M will provide max{1, ..., m}-differential
privacy.
Parallel composition corresponds to cases where each Mi
is applied to disjointed subsets of the dataset. The ultimate
privacy guarantee only depends on the largest privacy budget.
Theorem 2. Sequential Composition: Suppose a set of privacy
steps M = {M1, ...Mm} are sequentially performed on a
dataset, and each Mi provides an  privacy guarantee, M
will provide (m · )-differential privacy.
Sequential composition offers a privacy guarantee for a
sequence of differentially private computations. When a series
of randomized mechanisms are performed sequentially on a
dataset, the privacy budgets are added up for each step.
III. DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY IN MACHINE LEARNING
A. Private machine learning
Private machine learning aims to protect the individuals
privacy in training data or learning models. Differential privacy
has been considered to be one of the most important tools in
private machine learning and has been heavily investigated in
the past decade.
The essential mechanisms in differential privacy all work
to extend current non-private machine learning algorithms
into differentially private algorithms. These extensions can be
realized by incorporating Laplace or exponential mechanisms
into non-private learning algorithms directly [16], or by adding
Laplace noise into the objective functions [7].
Starting with Kasiviswanathan et al.’s work [17], the line
of research presenting the details of private learning process
from privacy based on empirical risk minimization [18], [19],
to prediction [20], [21], Bayesian inference [22]–[24] and the
multi-armed bandit [25], [26].
Private machine learning is one of the most powerful models
accepted in this field. To avoid redundancy, this paper will
not dive into details of private machine learning. A number
of survey papers have discussed this field [16], [27]–[29]
thoroughly.
B. Differential privacy in learning stability
1) The overview of stability of learning: A stable learning
algorithm is one in which the prediction does not change much
when the training data is modified slightly. Bousquet et al. [30]
have proved that stability is linked to the generalization error
bound of the learning algorithm, indicating that a highly stable
algorithm leads to a less over-fit result. However, increasing
the stability of the algorithm is challenging when the size of
the testing data is limited. This is because the validate data
sometimes are reused and lead to an incorrect learning model.
To preserve statistical learning validity, analysts should collect
new data for a fresh testing set.
Differential privacy can be naturally linked to learning
stability. The concept of differential privacy ensures that the
probability of observing any outcome from an analysis is
essentially unchanged by modifying any single record. Dwork
et al. [4], [31] showed that differential privacy mechanisms
can be used to develop adaptive data analysis algorithms with
provable bounds for over-fitting, noting that certain stability
notions are necessary and sufficient for generalization. There-
fore, differential privacy is stronger than previous notions of
5stability and, in particular, possesses strong adaptive compo-
sition guarantees [32].
2) Differential privacy in learning stability: Dwork et
al. [4] show that, by adding noise to generate fresh testing
data, differential privacy mechanisms can achieve highly stable
learning. For a dataset D, an analyst learns about the data by
running a series of analyses fi on the dataset. The choice of
which analysis to run depends on the results from the earlier
analyses. Specifically, the analyst first selects a statistic f0 to
query on D and observes a query result y1 = f0(D). From
the kth analysis, the analyst selects a function fk based on
the query result y1, ..., ...yk−1. To improve the generalization
capability of the adaptive scenario, noise is added in each anal-
ysis iteration. For example, yk = Lap(∆f ) + fk−1(D) [31].
This type of adaptive analysis can be linked to machine
learning. The dataset D can be randomly partitioned into a
training set Dt and a testing (holdout) set Dh. The analyst
can access the training set Dt without restrictions but may
only access Dh through a differentially private interface. The
interface takes the testing and training sets as inputs and, for
all functions given by the analyst, provides statistically valid
estimates of each functions results.
For a sufficiently large testing set, the differential privacy
interface guarantees that for function f : D → [0, 1], the
mechanism will return a randomized value vf . When vf is
compared to the query result y, we have |vf − y| ≤ τ with a
probability of at least 1−β, where τ is the analysts choice of
error and β is the confidence parameter. The probability space
is over the data elements in Dh and Dt and the randomness
introduced by the interface. A multiplicative weight updating
mechanism [33] could also be included in the interface to
conserve the privacy budget.
3) Summary of stability of learning: The idea of adding
randomization during data analysis to increase stability has
been widely accepted. MacCoun et al. [34] believed: when
deciding which results to report, the analyst interacts with
a dataset that has been obfuscated through adding noise to
observations, removing some data points, or switching data
labels. The raw, uncorrupted, dataset is only used in computing
the final reported values. Differential privacy mechanisms
can follow the above rules to significantly improve learning
stability.
C. Differential privacy in fairness
1) An overview of the fairness in learning: Fairness issues
are prevalent in every facet of our lives including education,
job application, the parole of prisoners and so on [35]–[37].
Instead of resolving fairness issues, modern AI techniques,
however, can amplify social inequities and unfairness. For
example, an automated hiring system may be more likely
to recommend candidates from specific racial, gender or age
groups [38], [39]. A search engine may amplify negative
stereotypes by showing arrest-record ads in response to queries
for names predominantly given to African-American babies
but not for other names [40], [41]. Moreover, some software
systems that are used to measure the risk of a person recom-
mitting crime demonstrate a bias against African-Americans
over Caucasians with the same profile [42], [43]. To address
these fairness issues in machine learning, great effort has been
placed on developing definitions of fairness [44]–[46] and
algorithmic methods for assessing and mitigating undesirable
bias in relation to these definitions [47], [48]. A typical idea
is to make algorithms insensitive to one or multiple attributes
of datasets, such as gender and race.
2) Applying differential privacy to improve fairness: Dwork
et al. [49] classified individuals with the goal of preventing
discrimination against a certain group while maintaining utility
for the classifier. The key idea is to treat similar individuals
similarly. To implement this idea, these researchers adopted the
Lipschitz property, which requires that any two individuals,
x and y, with a distance of d(x, y) ∈ [0, 1] must map to
the distributions M(x) and M(y), respectively, such that
the statistical distance between M(x) and M(y) is at most
d(x, y) [50]. In other words, if the difference between x and
y is d(x, y), the difference of the classification outcomes of x
and y is at most d(x, y). A connection between differential
privacy and the Lipschitz property has been theoretically
established, in that a mapping satisfies differential privacy if,
and only if, this mapping satisfies the Lipschitz property [49].
Zemel et al. [51] extended Dwork et al.s [49] prelimi-
nary work by defining the metrics between individuals. They
learned a restricted form of a distance function and formulated
fairness as an optimization problem of finding the intermediate
representation that best encodes the data. During the process,
they preserved as much information about the individuals
attributes as possible, while removing any information about
membership with other protected subgroup. The goal was
two-fold: first, the intermediate representation should preserve
the datas original features as much as possible. Second, the
encoded representation is randomized to hide whether or not
the individual is from the protected group.
Both ideas take advantage of randomization in differen-
tial privacy. Considering an exponential mechanism with a
carefully designed score function, the framework can sample
fresh data from the universe to represent original data with
the same statistical properties. However, the most challenging
part of this framework is designing the score function. This
is because differential privacy in fairness assumes that the
similarity between individuals is given; however, estimating
similarity between individuals in an entire feature universe is
a tough problem. In other words, the evaluation of similarity
between individuals is the key obstacle of model fairness,
making score function design an obstinate problem. Therefore,
differential privacy in model fairness needs further exploration.
Recently, researchers have attempted to adopt differential
privacy to simultaneously achieve both fairness and privacy
preservation [52], [53]. This research is motivated by settings
where models are required to be non-discriminatory in terms
of certain attributes, but these attributes may be sensitive and
so must be protected while training the model [54]. Addressing
fairness and privacy preservation simultaneously is challenging
because they have different aims [53], [55]. Fairness focuses
on the group level and seeks to guarantee that the models
predictions for a protected group (such as female) are the
same as the predictions made for an unprotected group. In
6comparison, privacy preservation focuses on the individual
level. Privacy preservation guarantees that the output of a
classification model is independent of whether any individual
record is in or out of the training dataset. A typical solution to
achieve fairness and privacy preservation simultaneously was
proposed by Ding et al. [53]. Their solution is to add a dif-
ferent amount of differentially private noise based on different
polynomial coefficients of the constrained objective function,
where the coefficients relate to attributes in the training dataset.
Therefore, privacy is preserved by adding noise to the objective
function, and fairness is achieved by adjusting the amount of
noise added to the different coefficients.
3) Summary of differential privacy in fairness: The best
methods of similarity measurement and composition are open
problems in fairness models. Further, differential privacy in
fairness models has been directed toward classification prob-
lems. There are also some works on fairness in online settings
such as online learning, bandit learning and reinforcement
learning. However, how to use differential privacy mechanisms
to benefit those online settings of fairness needs further
investigation.
Composition fairness is also a big challenge. Here, fair-
ness means that if each component in the algorithm satisfies
the notion of fairness, the entire algorithm will satisfy the
same [6]. This composition property is essential for machine
learning, especially for online learning. Dwork et al. [56]
explored this direction, finding that current methods seldom
achieve this goal because classification decisions cannot be
made independently, even by a fair classifier. Also, classifiers
that satisfy group fairness properties may not compose well
with other fair classifiers. Their results show that the signal
provided by group fairness definitions under composition is
not always reliable. Hence, further study is needed to figure
out how to take advantage of differential privacy to ensure
composition.
D. Summary of differential privacy in machine learning
Table II summarizes the papers that apply differential pri-
vacy to learning stability and fairness. From this summary, we
can see that differential privacy can not only preserve privacy
but also improve the stability and fairness in machine learning.
The key idea of achieving stability is derived from allowing an
analyst to access the testing set only in a differentially private
manner. Likewise, the main idea of achieving fairness is also
derived from randomly re-sampling fresh data from the data
universe in a differentially private manner. The two examples
show that the sampling from the data universe can improve
the machine learning performance to some extent.
Even though differential privacy has been proven to guar-
antee privacy, stability and fairness in machine learning,
there are still some open research issues. First, to preserve
privacy, the utility of learning models is sacrificed to some
extent. Thus, how to obtain an optimal trade-off between
the privacy and the utility still needs further exploration.
Second, current differentially private stable learning is suitable
only for the learning models where loss functions do not
have regularization. Differential privacy can provide additional
generalization capability to the learning models who has lim-
ited regularization. Hence, improving generalization capability
for regularized loss functions will be helpful. Third, the re-
sampling in current fair learning is typically based on the
exponential mechanism. Exponential mechanism requires the
knowledge of the utility of each sample. This knowledge,
however, may not be available or hardly be defined in some
situations. Thus, new mechanisms are needed for today’s fair
learning.
Research on differential privacy in machine learning can be
broadened to address other non-privacy issues. For example,
differential privacy mechanisms may be able to generate new
data samples based on existing ones by properly adding noise
to the values of attributes in existing samples. These newly-
generated samples may not be suitable for training data, but
they can be used as testing data. Another example is that
differential privacy mechanisms can be used for sampling.
Sampling is an important step in deep reinforcement learning
and batch learning. The small database mechanism may be
a good tool for sampling in machine learning, as it can
guarantee the desired accuracy while sampling only a small
set of samples.
IV. DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY IN DEEP LEARNING
Deep learning originated from regular neural networks
but thanks to the availability of large volumes of data and
advancements in computer hardware, implementing many-
layered neural network models has become feasible, and these
models significantly outperforms their predecessors. The latest
deep learning algorithms have been successfully applied to
many applications such as natural language processing, image
processing, and speech and audio processing [57]. Differential
privacy has been broadly used in deep learning to preserve data
and model privacy. Thus, in this section, we mainly focus
on analyzing the differential privacy in general deep neural
networks, distributed deep learning [58] and federated learning
[59].
A. Deep neural networks: attacks and defences
1) Privacy attacks in the deep neural networks: One of the
most common privacy attacks is an inference attack where the
adversary maliciously infers sensitive features and background
information about a target individual from a trained model
[60]. Typically, there are two types of inference attacks in
deep learning.
The first type is a membership inference attack. The aim
here is to infer whether or not a given record is in the
present training dataset [61]. Membership inference attacks
can be either black-box or white-box. Black-box means that
an attacker can query a target model but does not know any
other details about that model, such as its structure [62]. In
comparison, white-box means that an attacker has full access
to a target model along with some auxiliary information [63].
The attack model is based on the observation that machine
learning models often behave differently on training data
versus the data they “see” for the first time.
7TABLE II
SUMMARY OF DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY IN MACHINE LEARNING
Papers Research areas Techniques used Research aims Advantages Disadvantages
Dwork et al. [4], [31] Stable learning Laplacemechanism Improve stability
Improve stability
with little overhead
Limited access
to testing dataset
Dwork et al. [49] Fairness in learning Concept ofdifferential privacy Improve fairness
Not only enforce
fairness but also
detect unfairness
An available similarity
metric is assumed
a prerequisite
Zemel et al. [51] Fairness in learning Concept ofdifferential privacy Improve fairness
Simultaneously encode
and obfuscate data Representation dependent
Xu et al. [52] Fairness in learning Laplacemechanism
Improve fairness and
preserve privacy
Achieve both fairness
and privacy
For logistic
regression only
Jagielski et al. [54] Fairness in learning Laplacemechanism
Improve fairness and
preserve privacy
Achieve both
fairness and privacy Need large dataset
Ding et al. [53] Fairness in learning Functionalmechanism
Improve fairness and
preserve privacy
Achieve both fairness
and privacy
For logistic
regression only
The second type of attack is an attribute inference attack.
The aim of an attribute inference attack is to learn hidden
sensitive attributes of a test input given access to the model and
information about the non-sensitive attributes [64]. Fredrikson
[64] describes a typical attribute inference attack method,
which attempts to maximize the posterior probability estimate
of the sensitive attributes based on the values of non-sensitive
attributes.
2) Differential privacy in deep neural networks: Some of
the properties of differential privacy are naturally resistant
to membership and attribute inference attacks. An intuitive
way to resist inference attacks is to properly add differentially
private noise to the values of the sensitive attributes before
using the dataset to train a model. In a typical deep learning
algorithm, there are four places to add noise, as shown in
Figure 5. The first place is the training dataset, where the
noise is derived from an input perturbation mechanism. This
operation occurs before the training starts and is usually done
to resist attribute inference attacks.
x y
w Loss Function L(w, x)
SGD Solution of L(w,x)
min L(w,x)
Differential privacy1
1
2 3
4
5
Fig. 5. Differential privacy in deep learning
The second place is the loss function, which yields an ob-
jective perturbation mechanism. This operation occurs during
training and is usually done to resist membership inference
attacks.
The third place is the gradients at each iteration, i.e.,
a gradient perturbation mechanism. Gradients are computed
using the loss function to do partial-derivative against the
weights of the deep neural network. Likewise, this operation
occurs during training and is usually done to resist membership
inference attacks.
The fourth place is the weights of the deep neural network,
constituting the learned model, called an output perturbation
mechanism. This operation happens once training is complete.
The operation is easy to implement and can resist both
membership and attribute inference attacks. However, directly
adding noise to the model may significantly harm its utility,
even if the parameter values in differential privacy have been
carefully adjusted.
Of these four places, adding noise to the gradients is the
most common method. However, because the gradient norm
may be unbounded in deep learning, a bound must be imposed
before applying gradient perturbation. A typical way is to
manually clip the gradient at each iteration [65]. Such a
clipping can also provide a sensitivity bound with differential
privacy. Table III summarizes the properties of the mentioned
attacks and their defence strategies.
From Table III, we can see that adding noise to a dataset
can defend against attribute inference attacks. Since the aim
of attribute inference attacks is to infer the values of sen-
sitive attributes, directly adding noise to these values is the
most straightforward and efficient method of protecting them.
However, this method may significantly affect the utility of the
learned model, because it is heavily dependent on the values
of the attributes in the training dataset, and using a dataset
with modified attribute values to learn a model is similar to
using a “wrong” dataset.
By comparison, adding noise to the loss function or gradient
only slightly affects the utility of the learned model. This
is because the noise is added during the training process
and the model can be corrected by taking the noise into
account. Adding noise to the loss function or gradient can
resist membership inference attacks, which can be guaranteed
by the properties of differential privacy. However, adding noise
to the loss function or gradient does not offer much resistance
to attribute inference attacks. As mentioned before, a typical
attribute inference attack needs two pieces of information:
1) the underlying distribution of the training dataset; and 2)
the values of non-sensitive attributes. These two pieces of
information are not modified when adding noise to the loss
function or gradient.
Finally, adding noise to the weights or classes of a neural
network can resist both membership and attribute inference
attacks. This is because adding noise to the weights will
modify the learned model and both of these types of attacks
need to access the learned model to launch an attack. The
downside is that adding noise to a learned model after training
may drastically affect its utility, and retraining the model will
not correct the problem as noise simply needs to be added
again. Noise could be added to the weights in each iteration
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ATTACKS AND DEFENSE IN DEEP LEARNING
Noise Membership inference attack Attribute inference attack Privacy guarantee Performance impact
Dataset [66] X very strong high
Loss function [67] X strong low
Gradient [65], [68], [69] X strong low
Weights [70], [71] X X very strong very high
Classes [72]–[74] X X very strong low
of training. However, this method might affect convergence,
since the output of the algorithm is computed based on the
weights. Hence, if noise is added to each weight, the total
amount of noise might become large enough to make the loss
never convergent. Adding noise to the classes has the similar
disadvantage for the same reason.
B. Differential privacy in distributed deep learning
1) Overview of distributed deep learning: Conventional
deep learning is limited to a single-machine system, where
the system has all the data and carries out the learning
independently. Distributed deep learning techniques, however,
accelerate the learning process. Two main approaches are
applied in distributed deep learning: data parallelism and
model parallelism [58]. In data parallelism, a central model
is replicated by a server and distributed to all the clients.
Each client then trains the model based on her own data.
After a certain period of time, each client summarizes an
update on top of the model and shares the update to the
server. The server then synchronizes the updates from all the
clients and improves the central model. In model parallelism,
all the data are processed with one model. The training of the
model is split between multiple computing nodes, with each
computes only a subset of the model. As data parallelism can
intrinsically protect the data privacy of clients, most research
on distributed deep learning focuses on data parallelism.
2) Differential privacy in distributed deep learning: As
mentioned in the previous subsection, differentially private
noise can be added to five places in a deep neural network.
The following review is divided into methods based on adding
noise.
Adding noise to input datasets. Heikkila et al. [66] proposed
a general approach for privacy-preserving learning in dis-
tributed settings. Their approach combines secure multi-party
communication with differentially private Bayesian learning
methods so as to achieve distributed differentially private
Bayesian learning. In their approach, each client i adds a
Gaussian noise to her data and divides them and the noise
into shares. Each share is then sent to a server. In this way,
the sum of the shares discloses the real value, but separately
they are just random noise.
Adding noise to loss functions. Zhao et al. [67] proposed a
privacy-preserving collaborative deep learning system that al-
lows users to collaboratively build a collective learning model
while only sharing the model parameters, not the data. To
preserve the private information embodied in the parameters,
a functional mechanism, which is an extended version of the
Laplace mechanism, was developed to perturb the objective
function of the neural network.
Adding noise to gradients. Shokri and Shmatikov [68]
designed a system that allows participants to independently
train on their own datasets and share small subsets of their
models’ key parameters during training. Thus, participants can
jointly learn an accurate neural network model without sharing
their datasets, and can also benefit from the models of others to
improve their learning accuracy while still maintaining privacy.
Abadi et al. [65] developed a differentially private stochastic
gradient descent algorithm for distributed deep learning. At
each iteration during the learning, Gaussian noise is added
to the clipped gradient to preserve privacy in the model. In
addition, their algorithm also involves a privacy accountant
and a moment accountant. The privacy accountant computes
the overall privacy cost during the training, while the moment
accountant keeps track of a bound on the moments of the
privacy loss random variable.
Cheng et al. [69] developed a privacy-preserving algorithm
for distributed learning based on a leader-follower framework,
where the leaders guide the followers in the right direction to
improve their learning speed. For efficiency, communication
is limited to leader-follower pairs. To preserve the privacy of
leaders, Gaussian noise is added to the gradients of the leaders’
learning models.
Adding noise to weights. Jayaraman et al. [70] applied
differential privacy with both output perturbation and gradient
perturbation in a distributed learning setting. With the output
perturbation, each data owner combines their local model
with a secure computation and adds Laplace noise to the
aggregated model estimator before revealing the model. With
the gradient perturbation, the data owners collaboratively train
a global model using an iterative learning algorithm, where, at
each iteration, each data owner aggregates their local gradient
within a secure computation and adds Gaussian noise to the
aggregated gradient before revealing the gradient update.
Phan et al. [71] proposed a heterogeneous Gaussian mech-
anism to preserve privacy in deep neural networks. Unlike
a regular Gaussian mechanism, this heterogeneous Gaussian
mechanism can arbitrarily redistribute noise from the first
hidden layer and the gradient of the model to achieve an ideal
trade-off between model utility and privacy loss. To obtain
the property of arbitrary redistribution, a noise redistribution
vector is introduced to change the variance of the Gaussian
distribution. Further, it can be guaranteed that, by adapting
the values of the elements in the noise redistribution vector,
more noise can be added to the more vulnerable components
of the model to improve robustness and flexibility.
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oped a model called Private Aggregation of Teacher Ensembles
(PATE) which has been successfully applied to generative
adversarial nets (GAN) for privacy guarantees [75]. PATE
consists 1) an ensemble of n teacher models; 2) an aggregation
mechanism; and 3) a student model. Each teacher model is
trained independently on a subset of private data. To protect
the privacy of data labels, Laplace noise is added to the output
classes, i.e., the teacher votes. Last, the student model is
trained through knowledge transfer from the teacher ensemble
with the public data and privacy-preserving labels. Later,
Papernot et al. [73] improved the PATE model to make it
applicable to large-scale tasks and real-world datasets. Zhao
[74] also improved the PATE model by extending it to the
distributed deep learning paradigm. Each distributed entity
uses deep learning to train a teacher network on private and
labeled data. The teachers then transfer the knowledge to the
student network at the aggregator level in a differentially-
private manner by adding Gaussian noise to the predicted
output classes of the teacher networks. This transfer uses non-
sensitive and unlabeled data for training.
3) Summary of differential privacy in distributed deep
learning: Although a number of privacy-preserving methods
have been proposed for distributed deep learning, there are
still some challenging issues that have not yet been properly
addressed. The first issue is synchronization. If data paral-
lelism has too many training modules, it has to decrease the
learning rate to ensure a smooth training procedure. Similarly,
if model parallelism has too many segmentations, the output
from the nodes will reduce training efficiency [58]. Differential
privacy offers potential for solving this issue. Technically,
the challenge is a coordination problem, where modules or
nodes collaboratively perform a task, but each has a privacy
constraint. This coordination problem can be modeled as a
multi-player cooperative game, and differential privacy has
been proven as effective for achieving equilibria in this game
[76].
The second issue is collusion. Most of the existing methods
assume non-collusion between multiple computation parties.
This assumption, however, may fail in some situations. For
example, multiple service providers may collude to obtain a
user’s private information. Joint differential privacy may be
able to address this issue, as it has been proven to successfully
protect any individual user’s privacy even if all the other users
collude against that user [77].
The third issue is privacy policies. Most existing methods
rely on privacy policies that specify which data can be used
by which users according to what rules. However, there is
no guarantee that all the users will strictly follow the privacy
policies. Differential privacy may be available to deal with this
issue, as differential privacy can guarantee users will truthfully
report their types and faithfully follow the recommendations
given by the privacy policies.
C. Differential privacy in federated learning
1) Overview of federated learning: Federated learning en-
ables individual users to collaboratively learn a shared predic-
tion model while keeping all the training data on the users’
Smart 
device
Smart 
device
Smart 
device
Training centre
...
Personalised models
General model
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Fig. 6. Federated Learning Framework
local devices. Federated learning was first proposed by Google
in 2017 as an additional approach to the standard centralised
machine learning approaches [78], and has been applied to
several real-world applications [79].
Fig. 6 shows the structure of a simple federated learning
framework. First, the training centre distributes a general
learning model, trained on general data, to all the smart devices
in the network. This model is used for general purposes,
such as image processing. In a learning iteration, each user
downloads a shared model from the training centre to their
local device. Then, they improve the downloaded model by
learning from their own local data. Once complete, the changes
to each user’s local model are summarized as a small update,
which is sent to the training centre through a secure communi-
cation channel. Once the cloud server receives all the updates,
the shared model is improved wholesale. During the above
learning process, each user’s data remain on their own device
and is never shared with either the training centre or another
user.
However, although private user data cannot be directly
obtained by others, it may be indirectly leaked through the
updates. For example, the updates of the parameters in an
optimization algorithm, such as stochastic gradient descent
[80], may leak important data information when exposed
together with data structures [81]. Differential privacy can,
however, resolve this problem, as explained next.
2) Applying differential privacy in federated learning:
Although no training data is transferred from mobile devices
to the cloud centre in federated learning, simply keeping data
locally does not provide a strong enough privacy guarantee
when conventional learning methods are used. For exam-
ple, adversaries can use differential attacks to discover what
data was used during training through the parameters of the
learning model [2]. To protect against these types of attacks,
several algorithms that incorporate differential privacy have
been proposed that ensure a learned model does not reveal
whether the data from a mobile device was used during
training [82].
Adversaries can also interfere with the messages exchanged
between communicating parties, or they can collude among
communicating parties during training to attack the accuracy
of the learning outcomes. To ensure the resulting feder-
ated learning model maintains acceptable prediction accuracy,
approaches using both differential privacy mechanisms and
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secure multiparty computation frameworks have been created,
providing formal data privacy guarantees [83].
Geyer et al. [2] incorporated differential privacy mecha-
nisms into federated learning to ensure that whether an in-
dividual client participates in the training cannot be identified.
This approach protects the entire data of an individual client.
To achieve this aim, in each communication round, a subset
of the total clients is randomly selected. Then, the difference
between the central model and each of the selected client’s
local model is calculated, and Gaussian noise is added to the
difference.
Shi et al. [84] investigated a distributed private data analysis
setting, where multiple mutually distrustful users co-exist and
each of them has private data. There is also an untrusted data
aggregator in the setting who wishes to compute aggregate
statistics over these users. The authors adopted computational
differential privacy to develop a protocol, which can output
meaningful statistics with a small total error even when some
of the users fail to respond. Also, the protocol can guarantee
the privacy of honest users, even when a portion of the users
are compromised and colluding.
Agarwal et al. [85] combined two aspects of distributed
optimization in federated learning: 1) quantization to reduce
the total communication cost; and 2) adding Gaussian noise to
the gradient before sending the result to the central aggregator
to preserve the privacy of each client.
3) Summary of differential privacy in federated learning:
The main advantage of the federated leaning model is that
none of the training data needs be transferred to the cloud
centre which satisfies the basic privacy concerns of mobile
device users can be satisfied. However, federated learning
has some unique challenges, mainly in the following three
respects:
• Issues related to attacks on various vulnerabilities of
the federated learning model and the countermeasures to
defend against these attacks. For example, adversaries can
use differential attacks to determine which mobile users
have been included in the learning process [86]; messages
can be tampered with; and adversaries can use model
poisoning attacks to cause the model to misclassify a set
of chosen inputs with high confidence [87], [88].
• Issues related to the learning algorithms, such as the
requirements of accuracy, scalability, efficiency, fault-
tolerance, etc. [78], [89].
• Issues related to the structure of the federated learning
system, including its communication efficiency, the com-
putational and power limitation of the mobile devices,
the reliability of the mobile devices and communication
system, etc. [86]. This issue can potentially be tackled
through the composition property of differential privacy
by fixing the privacy budget and forcing all communica-
tions to consume that budget.
To effectively use federated learning in various applications,
we first need to overcome the challenges related to attacks,
the system structures, and the learning algorithms. Therefore,
intensive research addressing these challenges will be required
in the near future. The second future development will be
to explore the power and benefits of federated learning for
both new and existing applications, especially now that mobile
devices are ubiquitous. The third future development will be
the automation of tools that use federated learning and the
emergence of companies providing such services to meet the
various needs of business and individual customers.
D. Summary of differential privacy in deep learning
Table IV summarizes the papers that apply differential
privacy to distributed deep learning and federated learning. In
this summary, we can see that most of these papers make use
of the Gaussian mechanism. This is because the probability
density function of the Gaussian distribution is differentiable,
and this property is necessary for calculating the gradient of
a learning model. The Laplace mechanism does not have this
property, so that it was seldom to be applied in deep learning.
It is worth pointing out that simply using differential privacy
mechanisms during a learning process may not provide enough
security to protect the privacy of a learning model or the
training data. This is because an adversary, who is pretending
to be an honest participant, can use a GAN [10] to generate
prototypical samples of a victim’s private training dataset, and
because the generated samples have the same distribution as
the victim’s training dataset, the adversary can bypass the pro-
tection of differential privacy [90]. A potential solution against
this security issue is to use local differential privacy. Unlike
regular differential privacy which takes into account all users’
data in a dataset, local differential privacy add randomization
on single user’s data [91]. Thus, local differential privacy has
a finer granularity and stronger privacy guarantee. Even if
an adversary has the access to the personal responses of an
individual user in the dataset, the adversary is still unable to
learn accurate information about the user’s personal data.
Moreover, there are two urgent research problems which
need further investigation. The first direction is model in-
version attack and its defense [92], [93]. Model inversion
attacks aim to infer the training data from a target model’s
predictions. To implement model inversion attacks, a popular
method is to train a second model called attack model [93].
The attack model takes the target model’s predictions as input
and outputs reconstructed data which are expected to be very
similar to the training data of the target model. Most of
existing defense methods focus only on membership inference
attacks so that their effectiveness on model inversion attacks
is still unclear. A potential defense method against model
inversion attacks is to adopt differential privacy to modify the
target model’s predictions. The major reason of the success of
model inversion attacks is owning to the redundant information
contained in the target model’s predictions. Thereby, if this
redundant information can be destroyed, the attacks can be
effectively defended.
The second direction is the client accuracy in federated
learning. In regular federated learning, the server takes the up-
dates from all clients equally, aiming to minimize an aggregate
loss function in general. However, minimizing an aggregate
loss function cannot guarantee the accuracy of individual
clients in the federated network [94], [95], which is unfair to
the clients. To improve the learning accuracy of the clients, Li
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TABLE IV
SUMMARY OF DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY IN DEEP LEARNING
Papers Research areas Techniques used Research aims Advantages Disadvantages
Papernot et al. [72] Deep learning Laplacemechanism Preserve privacy
Independent of
learning algorithms
Suitable only for
small-scale tasks
Papernot et al. [73] Deep learning Gaussianmechanism Preserve privacy
Suitable for
large-scale tasks
Need two
aggregators
Shokri et al. [68] Distributeddeep learning
Sparse
vector technique Preserve privacy
Preserve the privacy of
participants without
sacrificing the accuracy of
resulting models
Vulnerable to Generative
Adversarial Network
-based attacks [90]
Abadi et al. [65] Distributeddeep learning
Gaussian
mechanism Preserve privacy
Preserve the privacy of
deep neural networks
with non-convex
objectives
Effective in
a limited number of
deep neural networks
Heikkila et al. [66] Distributeddeep learning
Gaussian
mechanism Preserve privacy
Achieve DP in
distributed settings
Sacrifice
learning performance
Cheng et al. [69] Distributeddeep learning
Gaussian
mechanism Preserve privacy
Low differential
privacy budget and
high learning accuracy
High communication
overhead
Zhao [74] Distributeddeep learning
Gaussian
mechanism Preserve privacy
Use the teacher-student
paradigm to improve
learning performance
High communication
overhead
Jayaraman et al. [70] Distributeddeep learning
Zero-concentrated
DP mechanism Preserve privacy
Both output and gradient
are protected with
reduced noise
Data owners’ utility
cannot be maximized
Zhao et al. [67] Distributeddeep learning
Exponential and
Laplace mechanism
Preserve privacy and
improve stability
Preserve the privacy
of collective deep
learning systems with
the existence of
unreliable participants
Accuracy is less than
the centralized methods
Phan et al. [71] Distributeddeep learning
Gaussian
mechanism Preserve privacy
Achieve tight
robustness bound
Model accuracy
is sacrificed
Geyer et al. [2] Federated learning Gaussianmechanism Preserve privacy
Balance tradeoff
between privacy loss
and model performance
Model performance
depends on the
number of clients
Shi et al. [84] Federated learning Concept ofdifferential privacy Preserve privacy
No P2P communication
and fault tolerance
Focus only on
multi-input functions
Agarwal et al. [85] Federated learning Gaussian andbinomial mechanisms Preserve privacy
Achieve both
communication efficiency
and differential privacy
The analysis of
binomial mechanism
may not be tight
et al. [95] introduce an aggregate re-weighted loss function
in federated learning, where different clients are allocated
different weights. A limitation in this type of method is that
the server still need to send all the clients the same model
update. This limitation could be overcome by enabling the
server to send different model updates to different clients
according to each client’s requirements. The server could use
joint differential privacy [76] to differentiate the model updates
in federated learning.
V. DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY IN MULTI-AGENT SYSTEMS
A multi-agent system is a loosely coupled group of agents,
such as sensor networks [96], power systems [97] and cloud
computing [98], interacting with one another to solve complex
domain problems [99], [100]. An agent is an intelligent
entity that can perceive its environment and act upon the
environment through actuators. Currently, multi-agent systems
face challenges with privacy violation, security issues and
communication overhead.
In Mcsherry et al.’s early work [14], differential privacy
mechanisms were applied to auctions to diminish the impact
of untrusted participants. In multi-agent systems, differential
privacy mechanisms can also avoid malicious agents through
a similar mechanism. There is an increasing trend to apply
differential privacy techniques to multi-agent systems so as
to preserve the agents’ privacy [101] or improve the agents’
performance [102]. This section focuses on some key sub-
areas of multi-agent systems, including multi-agent learning,
auction, and game theory.
A. Differential privacy in multi-agent reinforcement learning
Multi-agent learning is generally based on the reinforcement
learning [103]. Normally, an agent learns proper behavior
through the interactions with their environment and other
agents in a trial-and-error manner. Every time an agent per-
forms an action, they receive a reward which tells them
how good that action was for accomplishing the given goal.
Importantly, agents can and do change their strategy to get or
better rewards. Therefore, the aim of the agent is to maximize
its long-term expected reward by taking sequential actions.
For example, Figure 7 shows a set of sweeper robots (the
agents with smiling or crying faces) who are collecting rubbish
from a grid (the red diamonds). When a robot plans to move
to the corner of the grid, it may try to move to the right first.
However, if it bumps into the wall, it receives a very low
reward; thus, the robot learns that moving to the right from
its current location is not a good idea.
Standard multi-agent learning approaches may need a large
number of interactions between agents and an environment
to learn proper behaviors [104]. Therefore, to improve agent
learning performance, agent advising was proposed, where
agents are allowed to ask for advice from each other [105].
For example, the robot in position (1, 1) in Fig. 7 can ask its
neighbor in (2, 2) for advice and may obtain the knowledge
that it cannot move to the left from its current location.
Existing agent advising approaches, however, suffer from
malicious agents who may provide false advice to hinder
the performance of the system, and heavy communication
overheads [106], [107] because agents are allowed to broadcast
12
to all their neighboring agents for advice [106], [107]. For
example, in Figure 7, the malicious robot (the crying face)
may provide false information to the other robots so that the
rubbish is not collected in time.
Agent 1
Agent 2 S: {coordination in the grid}
R: {high, low, negative}
A: {north, south, east, west}
Malicious
Fig. 7. A multi-agent learning example
1) Differential privacy to improve the security of the re-
inforcement learning: Differential privacy mechanisms can
provide a security guarantee that a malicious agent being in
or out of a multi-agent system has little impact on the utility
of other agents. As the probability of selecting neighbors to
ask for advice is based on the reward history provided by
neighbors, exponential or Laplace mechanisms can be applied
to this step to diminish the impact of malicious agents on
security purpose. Moreover, the composition of the privacy
budget can naturally control the communication overhead,
namely by limiting the amount of advice allowed throughout
the whole system.
Ye et al. [8] proposed a differentially private framework
to deal with malicious agents and communication overhead
problems. Using Fig. 7 as an example, suppose each agent in
the grid environment wants to move to the corner and has the
moving knowledge that can be shared with others.
Advice request
Advice 1
Advice 2
Adjust chosen 
probability based on dp 
Agent 1 Agent 2 Malicious Agent
Advice request
Fig. 8. Differentially private multi-agent system
Fig. 8 illustrates the process of agent interaction in this
example. Agent 2 send out an advice request to its neighbors.
Agent 1 and the malicious agent would give advice to agent 2.
Agent 1’s advice will include the best action in agent 2’s state
according to agent 1’s knowledge. However, the malicious
agent will always give false advice. After receiving advice
from both neighbors, agent 2 performs a differentially private
adviser selection algorithm, which applies an exponential
mechanism to adjust the chosen probabilities. Because the
malicious agent always provides false advice, the exponential
mechanism may filter its advice with a high probability. So
that the impact of the malicious agent will be diminished.
The system will stop communicating when the privacy budget
is used up, so that the privacy budget can be used to control
the communication overhead.
2) Summary of differential privacy in reinforcement learn-
ing: Differential privacy technology has been proven to im-
prove the performance of agent learning in addition to its use
as a privacy-preservation tool. Compared to the benchmark
broadcast-based approach, the differential privacy approach
achieves a better performance (normally evaluated by the total
reward of the system and the convergence rate) with less
communication overhead when malicious agents are present.
However, further exploration of differential privacy technique
in new environments, such as a dynamic or an uncertain
environment, would be worthwhile.
B. Differential privacy in auction
Auction-based approaches are effective in multi-agent sys-
tems for task and resource allocation [108]. Normally, there
are three parties in an auction, including a seller, an auctioneer
and a group of buyers. The auctioneer presents the item
and receives bids from the buyers following a pre-established
bidding convention. This convention determines the sequence
of bids as well as the way to decide the winner and the
price. The current privacy-preserving mechanisms are mainly
based on cryptography and multi-party secure computation.
However, there may still be privacy leaks if one infers their
sensitive information from the auction’s outcomes. Differential
privacy techniques can help to combat this issue [109]. The
current differentially private auction mechanisms are mostly
designed for spectrum allocation in wireless communication.
Radio spectrum is a scarce resource and thus, the allocation
of it needs to be managed carefully. However, communication
also comes with a high desirability for security, resulting in
several private spectrum auction mechanisms.
Zhu et al. [110] proposed a differentially private spectrum
auction mechanism with approximate revenue maximization.
Their mechanism consists of three steps. First, the auctioneer
partitions the bidders into groups and subgroups. Second,
the auctioneer initializes the set of prices and calculates the
probability distribution over these prices using the exponential
mechanism. Finally, based on the probability distribution, the
auctioneer randomly selects a price as the auction payment,
and the corresponding bidders are pronounced the winners.
Zhu and Shin [111] alternative achieves strategy-proofness
and is polynomially tractable. The mechanism performs an
auction in four steps. The auctioneer first partitions bidders
into groups. The auctioneer then creates virtual channels for
bidders based on their geographical locations and a conflict
graph. Next, the auctioneer computes the probability of select-
ing each bidder as the winner. Finally, the auctioneer selects
the winner based on an exponential mechanism and determines
the payment for the winner.
Wu et al. [112] developed a differentially private auc-
tion mechanism which guarantees bid privacy and achieves
approximate revenue maximization. In their mechanism, the
auctioneer first groups bidders based on their conflict graph,
and next determines the price for winners in each group using
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an exponential mechanism. Finally, the auctioneer selects the
winner based on sorted group revenues.
Chen et al. [109] designed a differentially private double
spectrum auction mechanism. Their mechanism is a uniform
price auction mechanism, where all sellers are paid with a
selling clearing price and all buyers groups are charged with a
buying clearing price. They apply an exponential mechanism
twice, once to select a selling clearance price and again to
select a buying clearance price.
In addition to spectrum allocation, differentially private
auction mechanisms have also been developed for resource
allocation in cloud computing. Xu et al. [113] proposed a
differentially private auction mechanism for trading cloud
resources, which preserves the privacy of individual bidding
information and achieves strategy-proofness. Their mechanism
iteratively progresses through a set of rounds, where each
round consists of four steps. The auctioneer first uses the
exponential mechanism to compute the probability distribution
over the set of current bids. Next, the auctioneer randomly
selects a bid from the set as the winner in the current round.
The auctioneer then creates a payment scheme for the winner.
Finally, the winner is removed from the set.
1) Summary of differential privacy in auctions: Although
differential privacy in auctions has been widely accepted, these
approaches typically assume a seller or an auctioneer can
directly interact with all potential buyers. This assumption,
however, may not be applicable to some real situations, where
sellers and buyers are organized in a network, e.g., social
networks [114], [115]. Auctions in social networks introduce
new challenging privacy issues.
The first issue is the bidding propagation. In a social
network, a bid from a buyer cannot be sent directly to the
seller but has to be propagated by other agents to the seller.
These intermediate agents may be potential buyers and are
thus competitive to that buyer. Therefore, the bid value of that
buyer is private and cannot be disclosed to others. An intuitive
way to protect the privacy of that buyer is to add Laplace noise
to the bid value. However, this does not stop the problem of
a seller receiving a fake bid and making a wrong decision.
The second issue is social relationships. During bid propa-
gation, a trajectory forms which indicates who is engaged in
the propagation. By investigating this trajectory, the seller may
learn things about the buyer’s social relationships.
C. Differential privacy in game theory
Game theory is a mathematical model used to study the
strategic interaction among multiple agents or players [116].
Game theory has been broadly studied and applied in various
domains, e.g., economic science [117], social science [116]
and computer science [118]. Most of these studies, however,
overlook the privacy of agents, the malicious agents or the
stability of the game playing process. To tackle these issues,
differential privacy techniques have been introduced into game
theory [119]–[121].
Differential privacy-based game theory research can be
roughly classified into two categories: 1) using differential
privacy to improve the performance of game theory, e.g.,
stability and equilibrium, and 2) applying differential privacy
to preserve the privacy of agents in games.
1) Differential privacy to improve the performance: Kearns
et al. [76] developed a differentially private recommender
mechanism for incomplete information games. Thanks to
differential privacy techniques, their mechanism achieves equi-
libria of complete information games even with a large number
of players and any player’s action only slightly affects the
payoffs for other players. Their mechanism offers a proxy
that can recommend actions to players. Players are free to
decide whether to opt in to the proxy, but if players do opt in,
they must truthfully report their types. In addition to satisfy
the game-theoretic properties, the mechanism also guarantees
player privacy, namely that no group of players can learn much
about the type of any player outside the group.
Rogers and Roth [122] improved the performance and
defense of malicious users by expanding on Kearns et al.’s
work [76] to allow players to falsely report their types even if
the players opt in to the proxy. They theoretically show that by
using differential privacy to form an approximate Bayes-Nash
equilibrium, players have to truthfully report their types and
faithfully follow the recommendations.
Pai et al. [102] improved game performance as well. They
studied infinitely repeating games of imperfect monitoring
with a large number of players, where players observe noisy
results, generated by differential privacy mechanisms, about
the play in the last round. The authors find that, theoretically,
folk theorem equilibria may not exist in such settings, which
concern all the Nash equilibria of an infinitely repeated game.
Based on this finding, they yield antifolk theorems [123],
where restrictions are imposed on the information pattern
of repeated games such that individual deviators cannot be
identified [124].
Lykouris et al. [125] increased game stability by analyzing
the efficiency of repeated games in dynamically changing
environments and population sizes. They draw a strong con-
nection between differential privacy and the high efficiency of
learning outcomes in repeated games with frequent change.
Here, differential privacy is used as a tool to find solutions
that are close to optimal and robust to environmental changes.
Han et al. [126] developed an approximately truthful mech-
anism to defend against malicious users in an application to
manage the charging schedules of electric vehicles. To ensure
users to truthfully report their specifications, their mechanism
takes advantage of joint differential privacy which can limit
the sensitivity of the scheduling process to changes in user
specifications. Therefore, any individual user cannot benefit
from misreporting his specification, which results in truthful
reports.
2) Applying differential privacy to preserve the privacy:
Hsu et al. [127] modelled the private query-release problem
in differential privacy as a two-player zero-sum game be-
tween a data player and a query player. Each element of the
data universe for the data player is interpreted as an action.
The data player’s mixed strategy is a distribution over her
databases. The query player has two actions for each query.
The two actions are used to penalize the data player, when
the approximate answer to a query is too high or too low. An
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offline mechanism, based on the Laplace mechanism, is then
developed to achieve the private equilibrium of the game.
Zhang et al. [77] developed a general mobile traffic of-
floading system. They used the Gale-Shapley algorithm [128]
to optimize the offloading station allocation plan for mobile
phone users. In this algorithm, to protect users’ location
privacy, they proposed two differentially private mechanisms
based on a binary mechanism [129]. The first mechanism is
able to protect the location of privacy of any individual user
when all the other users are colluding against this user, but the
administrator is trusted. The second mechanism is stronger
than the first mechanism because it assumes that even the
administrator is untrusted.
Zhou et al. [130] adopted an aggregation game to model
spectrum sharing in large-scale and dynamic networks, where
a set of users compete for a set of channels. They then applied
differential privacy techniques to guarantee the truthfulness
and privacy of the users. Specifically, they use a Laplace
mechanism to add noise to the cost threshold and users’ costs
to protect this information. Moreover, they use an exponential
mechanism to decide the mixed strategy aggregative con-
tention probability distribution for each user so as to preserve
the privacy of users’ utility functions.
3) Summary of differential privacy in game theory: The
current research on differential privacy in game theory has
mainly focused on static environments. These same issues
in dynamic environments are generally still open. Of the
little research that does consider dynamic environments [125],
only changes in population are considered while overlooking
changes in other areas, such as the strategies available to each
agent or the utility of each of those strategies. Studying game
theory with changing available strategies is a challenging issue,
as these types of changes may result in no equilibria between
agents. This is because no matter which strategy is taken by
an agent, other agents may always have strategies to defeat
that agent. In other words, other agents are incentivized to
unilaterally change their strategies. However, since differential
privacy can be used to force agents to report truthfully, it may
also be used to force agents to reach equilibria.
D. Summary of multi-agent systems
Table V summarizes the papers that apply differential pri-
vacy to multi-agent systems. In this summary, three important
facts are involved. First, some of these papers use differential
privacy not to preserve the privacy of agents but for other
aims, e.g., avoiding malicious agents and improving agents’
performance. This implies that the differential privacy tech-
nique is able to achieve other research aims besides privacy
preservation. In keeping with this spirit, more potential appli-
cations of differential privacy are worthy of research. Second,
by using differential privacy, the common disadvantage is that
only approximate optimal results can be achieved. Thus, more
efficient differential privacy mechanisms need to be developed.
Third, most of these papers involve agent interaction; and
differential privacy is adopted to guarantee the privacy of
interaction information. Therefore, other multi-agent research,
which involves agent interaction, may also enjoy the benefits
of differential privacy and deserves further investigation. For
example, multi-agent negotiation enables multiple agents to al-
ternatively provide offers to reach agreements on given events
or goods [131]. However, offers may explicitly or implicitly
contain agents’ sensitive information, e.g., commercial secrets,
which should be protected. Another example is multi-agent
resource allocation. To allocate resources fairly, agents have
to reveal their preference over different types of resources
to others [132]. The preference, however, might be what the
agents incline to hide. In summary, differential privacy has a
great potential to solve diverse problems in multi-agent system.
VI. FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS
A. Private transfer learning
In addition to introducing differential privacy into stan-
dalone machine learning, differentially private transfer learn-
ing has also been investigated [133], [134]. Transfer learning
aims to transfer knowledge from source domains to improve
learning performance in target domains [134]. It is typically
used to handle the situation that data are not stored in one
place but distributed over a set of collaborative data centers
[135], [136]. For example, transfer learning can be used in
speech recognition to transfer the knowledge of connectionist
temporal classification model to the target attention-based
model to overcome the problem of limited speech resource in
the target domain [137]. Transfer learning can also be used in
recommendation systems to address the data-sparsity issue by
enabling knowledge to be transferred among recommendation
systems [138]. Instead of transferring raw data, the interme-
diate computation results are transferred from source domains
to target domains. However, even the intermediate results are
potentially vulnerable to privacy-breach [139], which is the
motivation of privacy-preserving transfer learning.
B. Deep reinforcement learning
Deep reinforcement learning is a combination of reinforce-
ment learning and deep learning [140], and could be used to
solve a wide range of complex decision-making problems that
were previously beyond the capability of regular reinforcement
learning. The learning process of deep reinforcement learning
is similar to regular reinforcement learning in that both are
based on trial-and-error. However, unlike regular reinforce-
ment learning which may use a reward value table (Q-table) to
store learned knowledge, deep reinforcement learning uses a
deep Q-network instead. One of the advantages of using a deep
Q-network is that deep reinforcement learning can take high-
dimensional and continuous states as inputs, which is close to
unfeasible with regular reinforcement learning.
Differential privacy in deep reinforcement learning has not
been researched thoroughly. Wang and Hegde [141] applied
differential privacy to deep reinforcement learning to protect
the value function approximator by adding Gaussian to the
objective function, but their work still focuses on the deep
learning aspects of the approach rather than the reinforcement
learning parts. Compared to standard reinforcement learning
and deep learning, deep reinforcement learning has some
unique features. First, the training samples are collected during
15
TABLE V
SUMMARY OF DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY IN MULTI-AGENT SYSTEMS
Papers Research areas Techniques used Research aims Advantages Disadvantages
Ye et al. [8] Multi-agent learning Laplacemechanism
Avoid
malicious agents
Avoid malicious agents
with low communication
and computation overhead
Malicious agents
cannot be identified
Zhu et al. [110] Auction in spectrum Exponentialmechanism Preserve privacy
Guarantee both the
truthfulness of bidders’
valuations and
their privacy
Only approximate
revenue maximization
Zhu and Shin [111] Auction in spectrum Exponentialmechanism Preserve privacy
Preserve the privacy of
both bidders and
the auctioneer together
Only near optimal
revenue achieved
Wu et al. [112] Auction Exponentialmechanism Preserve privacy
Guarantee both
bid privacy and fairness
Only approximate
revenue maximization
Chen et al. [109] Auction in spectrum Exponentialmechanism Preserve privacy
Preserve the privacy
of bidders in
double spectrum auctions
Only approximate social
welfare maximization
Xu et al. [113] Auction incloud computing
Exponential
mechanism Preserve privacy
Preserve the privacy of
consumers in
cloud environments
Only approximate
truthfulness and revenue
maximization guarantees
Hsu et al. [127] Game theory indatabases
Laplace
mechanism Preserve privacy
Preserve the privacy of
both individuals and
analysts of
database systems
Achieve only nearly
optimal error rates
Kearns et al. [76] Game theory Concept ofdifferential privacy
Preserve privacy and
Improve performance
Implement equilibria of
complete information
games in settings of
incomplete information
The type of a player
is still possible
to be revealed
Rogers and Roth [122] Game theory Concept ofdifferential privacy
Preserve privacy and
avoid malicious agents
Implement equilibria of
complete information
games in settings of
incomplete information
even if players
are lying
The type of a player
is still possible
to be revealed
Zhang et al. [77] Game theory inmobile communication
Binary
mechanism Preserve privacy
Preserve each user’s
location privacy even if
other users collude
The system administrator
is required to be
honest or semi-honest
Zhou et al. [130] Game theory inspectrum sharing
Laplace and
exponential
mechanisms
Preserve privacy
Guarantee both
truthfulness and privacy
of users
Achieve only
approximate Nash
equilibrium
Pai et al. [102] Game theory Concept ofdifferential privacy Improve performance
Quantify limit results
for repeated games
Achieve only
approximate equilibria
Lykouris et al. [125] Game theory Concept ofdifferential privacy Improve stability
Connect differential
privacy with learning
efficiency in
dynamic games
The solution is
approximate optimal
Han et al. [126] Game theory inelectric vehicles
Laplace
mechanism Avoid malicious agents
Reduce the incentive
of user misreporting
Achieve only
approximate truthfulness
learning rather than pre-assembled before learning. Second,
the training samples may not be independent but rather highly
correlated. Third, the training samples are not usually labelled.
Thus, to avoid overfitting with deep reinforcement learning,
experience replay is required, which means randomly selecting
a set of samples for training in each iteration. As discussed
in the previous sections, differential privacy can improve
the stability of learning. Therefore, it may be interesting to
research whether introducing differential privacy into deep
reinforcement learning can help to avoid overfitting.
C. Meta-learning
Meta-learning, also known as learning to learn, is a learning
methodology that systematically observes how different ma-
chine learning approaches perform on a wide range of learning
tasks and then learning from these observations [142]–[144].
In meta-learning, the goal of the trained model is to quickly
learn a new task from a small amount of new data. Also, the
trained model should be able to learn on a number of different
tasks [145], [146], but this opens the risk of breaching the
privacy of the different task owners [147].
Recently, Li et al. [147] introduced differential privacy into
meta-learning to preserve the privacy of task owners. Specifi-
cally, they use a certified (, δ)-differential privacy stochastic
gradient descent [148] with each task, which guarantees that
the contribution of each task owner carries global differential
privacy guarantees with respect to the meta-learner. However,
to guarantee global differential privacy, the number of tasks
has to be known beforehand. This is hard to know in some sit-
uations, such as online meta-learning where tasks are revealed
one after the other in a dynamic manner [149]. Therefore, it
would be worthwhile developing a new differential privacy-
based algorithm to preserve the privacy of task owners in
online meta-learning,
D. Generative adversarial networks
Generative adversarial networks (GANs) [10] are a frame-
work for producing a generative model by way of a two-player
minimax game. One player is the generator who attempts to
generate realistic data samples by transforming noisy samples
drawn from a distribution using a transformation function with
learned weights. The other player is the discriminator who
attempts to distinguish between synthetic data samples created
by the generator.
The GAN framework is one of the most successful learning
models and has been applied to applications such as imitat-
ing expert policies [150] and domain transfer [151]. More
recently, GANs have been extended to accommodate multiple
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generators and discriminators so as to address more complex
problems. Like other learning models, GAN frameworks also
suffer from the risk of information leaks. More specifically,
the generator model estimates the underlying distribution of a
dataset and randomly generates realistic samples, which means
the generator, through the power of deep neural networks,
remembers training samples. Now, when the GAN model is
applied to a private or sensitive dataset, the privacy of the
dataset may be leaked. To deal with this problem, Xu et al.
proposed a GAN-obfuscator [152], i.e., a differentially private
GAN framework, where carefully designed Gaussian noise is
added to the gradients of learning models during the learning
procedure. By using the GAN-obfuscator, an unlimited amount
of synthetic data can be generated for arbitrary tasks without
disclosing the privacy of training data. However, although
the framework can guarantee the privacy of training data,
there is only one generator and one discriminator in this
framework. Therefore, a useful direction of future research
might be to extend these principles to multiple generators and
discriminators to address more complex problems.
E. Multi-agent systems
1) Multi-agent advising learning: When an agent is in an
unfamiliar state during a multi-agent learning process, it may
ask for advice from another agent [106]. These two agents then
form a teacher-student relationship. The teacher agent offers
advice to the student agent about which action should be taken.
Existing research is based on a common assumption that the
teacher agent can offer advice only if it has visited the same
state as the student agents current state. But this assumption
might be relaxed by using differential privacy technique.
The property of differential privacy can be borrowed to
address the advice problem. Two similar states are interpreted
as two neighbouring datasets. The advice generated from
the states is interpreted as the query result yielded from
datasets. Since two results from neighbouring datasets can
be considered approximately identical, two pieces of advice
generated from two similar states can also be considered
approximately identical. This property can thus guarantee that
advice created in a state can still be used in another similar
state. Hence, this may be an interesting way to improve agent
learning performance.
2) Multi-agent transfer learning: When agents transfer
knowledge between each other to improve learning perfor-
mance, a key problem discussed is that privacy needs to
be preserved [107]. Existing methods are typically based on
homomorphic cryptosystems [153]–[155]. However, homo-
morphic cryptosystems have a high computation overhead and,
therefore, may not be very efficient in resource-constrained
systems, e.g., wireless sensor networks. Differential privacy,
with its light computation overhead, therefore, could be a good
alternative in these situations.
3) Multi-agent reasoning: Reasoning is an ability that
enables an agent to use known facts to deduce new knowledge.
It has been widely employed to address various real-world
problems. For example, knowledge graph-based reasoning can
be used in speech recognition to parse speech contents into
logical propositions [156], and case-based reasoning can be
adopted to address the data-sparsity issue in recommendation
systems by filling in the vacant ratings of the user-item matrix
[157]. A typical reasoning method is based on the Belief,
Desire and Intention (BDI) model [158]. An agent’s beliefs
correspond to information the agent has about the world.
Reasoning is a powerful tool in AI especially when it is
combined with deep neural networks. For example, Mao et al.
[159] has recently proposed a neuro-symbolic concept learner
which combines symbolic reasoning with deep learning. Their
model can learn visual concepts, words and semantic parsing
of sentences without explicit supervision on any of them. As
reasoning requires querying known facts which may contain
private information, privacy preservation becomes an issue
in reasoning process. Tao et al. [160] propose a privacy-
preserving reasoning framework. Their idea is to hide the
truthful answer from a querying agent by providing the answer
“Unknown” to a query. Then, the querying agent cannot
distinguish between the case that the query is being protected
and the case that the query cannot be inferred from the known
facts. However, simply hiding truthful answers may seriously
hinder the utility of querying results. Differential privacy, with
its theoretical guarantee of utility of querying results, may be
a promising technique for privacy-preserving reasoning.
Recently, there have been great efforts to combine differ-
ential privacy with reasoning [161]–[163]. These works, how-
ever, aim to take advantage of reasoning to prove differential
privacy guarantees of programs, instead of using differential
privacy to guarantee privacy-preserving reasoning. Therefore,
a potential direction of future research may be introducing
differential privacy into reasoning process to guarantee the
privacy of known facts.
F. Combination of machine learning, deep learning and multi-
agent systems
A novel research area by combining machine learning,
deep learning and multi-agent systems is the multi-agent deep
reinforcement learning (MADRL) [164]. In MADRL, multi-
agent system technique is used to coordinate the behaviors of
agents; machine learning technique is responsible for guiding
the learning process of agents; and deep learning is employed
by agents to learn efficient strategies.
One of the current research directions along MADRL is the
action advising [165]–[167]. Action advising in regular multi-
agent reinforcement learning allows a teacher agent to offer
only an action as advice to a student agent in a concerned state.
By comparison, action advising in MADRL usually allows a
student agent to query a teacher agent’s knowledge base to
receive action suggestions [167]. However, as the number of
states in MADRL is very large, an agent’s knowledge base
may contain the agent’s very rich private information that
should be protected. Privacy-preservation in MADRL is still
an open research problem which may be addressed by using
differential privacy.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we investigated the use of differential privacy
in selected areas of AI. We described the critical issues facing
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AI and the basic concepts of differential privacy, highlighting
how differential privacy can be applied to solving some of
these problems. We discussed the strengths and limitations of
the current studies in each of these areas and also pointed
out the potential research areas of AI where the benefits of
differential privacy remain untapped. In addition to the three
areas of focus in this article machine learning, deep learning
and multi-agent learning there are many other interesting areas
of research in AI that have also leveraged differential privacy,
such as natural language processing, computer vision, robotics,
etc. Surveying differential privacy in these areas is something
we intend to do in future work.
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